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Abstract
Rousseau’s philosophy can be situated as a continuum between the ancient and the modern traditions; 
we argue that it does not fully belong to either and this is particularly evident in his discussion of liberty. 
Our point of departure is a view that in order to grasp peculiarity of Rousseaus’ understanding of liberty 
we need to go beyond the liberal tradition and its scheme of thinking about freedom as well as beyond 
the intuitive understanding of liberty. The second part of the article presents an analysis of the four dif-
ferent meanings of liberty that we ﬁ nd in Rousseau’s theory: natural, social, moral and civil. The most 
important for political philosophy is his discussion of the shift from the natural to social and civil liberty 
and the insistence that true freedom cannot be totally separated from morality. Finally, we discuss some 
of the contemporary interpretations of Rousseau’s political thought which often emphasize one of the 
diﬀ erent meanings of liberty that we ﬁ nd in his writings. 
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I
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s political thought can be situated at the intersection of the an-
cient and the modern traditions. A half-way house, it can hardly ﬁ t the former due to its 
* Polish text: Wolnoś ć w uję ciu Jana-Jakuba Rousseau: pomię dzy staroż ytnymi a nowoż ytnymi, “Cracow 
Studies of Constitutional and Legal History” 9 (2016), issue 2, p. 211–232.
Wydanie specjalnego zeszytu czasopisma: „Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa” obejmują-
cego przekład na język angielski wyboru najlepszych tekstów opublikowanych w roku 2016 ﬁ nansowane 
w ramach umowy 508/P-DUN/2016 ze środków Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego przeznaczonych na 
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distinctly novel concepts of social contract and the state of nature, nor can it be accom-
modated within the latter, in spite of having contributing a great deal to it. As a conse-
quence Rousseau has been dubbed “the last of the ancients and the ﬁ rst of the moderns”.1 
The problem of aligning him with other modern systems lies in the tension between his 
key conviction that man has been depraved by artiﬁ cial civilization and rationalism – 
a thesis incompatible with any modern theory – and his aﬃ  rmation of the republic and 
its functions. It is enough to note that Adam Ferguson, a leading light of the Scottish 
Enlightenment who was close the republican tradition, believed that the development of 
civil society was a manifest sign of the progress of civilization in all respects – social, 
political, economic; and not least in the general improvement of manners and reﬁ nement 
of taste. To arrive at this civilized state the society had to leave behind its natural “rude-
ness”, or its primitive phase. Well aware of the vices and weaknesses of the commercial 
society, which gives greater scope to the articulation of individual rights and interests, 
Ferguson saw the cultivation of social and civic virtues as indispensable for the mainte-
nance of social and political order. However, it should be pursued in such a way as not to 
undermine the liberal doctrine of individual rights and freedoms. 
There is no better way of getting at the core of Rousseau’s thought than by putting 
aside some of the worn-out theoretical preconceptions about freedom, especially those 
that are sustained by the liberal tradition and its clichés, because they are incompatible 
with the logic of Rousseau’s argument. This is indeed the aim of the ﬁ rst part of this 
article where we claim that Rousseau’s concept of liberty cannot be understood properly 
without a suspension of the liberal and intuitive approach to freedom, usually associated 
with action or the opportunity to act made possible by both the availability of a range 
of options and the unimpeded exercise of free choice.2 In the second part of the article, 
which is central to our argument, we analyze the Rousseau’s idea of liberty and its vari-
ous meanings (it seems that he works with three or even four interlocking concepts of 
liberty). In the third and last part of the article we try to match these concepts with some 
of the contemporary interpretations of Rousseau’s political philosophy. While focusing 
our attention on Rousseau’s work, we must not completely disregard the factors that 
shaped it, ie. his complex personality, the story of his life, the character of his time and 
age, and ﬁ nally his friends and adversaries.3 Perhaps the main reason why Rousseau’s 
oeuvre has prompted such diverse interpretations is the fact that it goes against the grain 
of the dominant modern and contemporary theory, rooted in the liberal tradition, and in 
eﬀ ect eludes many of those conceptual categories of political philosophy that we take 
for granted. Meanwhile, though, the key role he accords to the idea of natural freedom 
and his abandonment of the teleological view of the universe can hardly be squared 
with classical republicanism. That being said, he does share a great many points of that 
doctrine, especially in his discussions of civil and democratic freedom. His approach is 
1  M. Qvortrup, The Political Philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Impossibility of Reason, 
Manchester–New York 2003, p. 105.
2  I. Berlin, Dwie koncepcje wolności [Two Concepts of Liberty] [in:] Cztery eseje o wolności, Polish 
transl. by D. Grinberg et al. of Four Essays on Liberty [Oxford University Press 1969], Warszawa 1994, p. 
191 (Note 12).
3  Cf. M. Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712–1754, New 
York 1983; and M. Cranston, The Solitary Self: Jean Jacques Rousseau in Exile and Adversity, Chicago 1997.
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as far removed from stoicism with its aﬃ  rmation of an inner freedom, or inner refuge, 
where man’s spirit can hold out against all external pressures and aﬄ  ictions, where one 
can feel free, even though one’s hands and feet are chained as it is from those political 
theories doctrines that associate freedom with action, either in the public sphere (re-
publicanism) or in private (the liberal tradition). Consequently, in getting to grips with 
Rousseau we cannot expect much help from Hannah Arendt’s assertion that the philo-
sophical tradition “distorted the very idea of freedom such as it is given in human ex-
perience by transposing it from its original ﬁ eld, the realm of politics and human aﬀ airs 
in general, to an inward domain, the will, where it would be open to self-inspection”, 
ignoring the postulate that whenever we speak about freedom “the question of politics 
and the fact that man is a being endowed with the gift of action must always be present to 
our mind”.4 For Rousseau the idea of the state is not crucial; his argument is founded on 
the idea of human nature and its essential characteristics. In consequence, his concept of 
freedom eludes the distinction between negative and positive liberty, which is premised 
on the existence of an external factor interfering with or hampering one’s exercise of free 
choice. As Isiah Berlin puts it, “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no 
man or body of men interferes with my activity’ and ‘The defence of liberty consists in 
the negative goal of warding oﬀ  interference”.5
Now let’s consider two ‘typical’ conceptualizations of freedom derived from the tra-
dition of political thought, which, as we have indicated earlier, need to be suspended 
before embarking on an analysis of Rousseau’ s doctrine. The ﬁ rst of them can be found 
in the republican tradition, preoccupied with the ideal of civitas libera, a free common-
wealth, whose members are not subjects, but citizens, each of whom is his own master. To put 
this ideal into practice individuals need to enjoy freedom to act in the political domain and be 
able to participate in decisions about the norms that bind their community. The citizens, de-
ﬁ ned by Aristotle as those ‘who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn’, make 
freedom and equality real by virtue of being active (this argument reverberates in Rousseau’s 
conception of civil liberty). As Arendt points out in Greek and Roman antiquity freedom was 
an exclusively political idea: “man could liberate himself from necessity only through power 
over other men, and he could be free only if he owned a place, a home in the world”.6 In this 
tradition it is the πόλις that provides the right place for the enactment of freedom: ancient 
liberty can only thrive in the public, political arena elevated over the entanglements of the 
private. Rousseau departs from that tradition because he takes as his premise the belief 
that man is born free, and not that he becomes free by virtue of adopting a social func-
tion. For Rousseau the norm is the original, innate human condition. However, unlike 
Locke, he does not treat freedom as one of the three fundamental, innate rights which 
drive the creation of a political community and government. While for the classical tra-
dition the essence of freedom is political (as in the Aristotelian concept of citizenship), 
the liberal tradition associates freedom with privacy and individual choice. From the 
latter perspective freedom is not about being one’s own master, but rather a matter of 
4  H. Arendt, Co to jest wolność [What Is Freedom] [in:] Między czasem minionym a przyszłym. Osiem 
ćwiczeń z myśli politycznej, Polish transl. by M. Godyń and W. Madej of Between Past and Future: Eight 
Exercises in Political Thought [New York: Viking 1968], Warszawa 2011, p. 178–179.
5  I. Berlin, Dwie koncepcje wolności [Two Concepts of Liberty], p. 182 and 188.
6  H. Arendt, Co to jest wolność? [What Is Freedom], p. 181.
1-łamanie z specjalny.indd   41 2017-12-15   15:03:08
42
Artykuły – Articles
personal independence which manifests itself in genuinely free choice, not oriented towards 
a predetermined goal. In eﬀ ect, the problem of individual freedom, i.e. the ability to make 
use of natural rights without external constraint, boils down to the questions “What can I do? 
What is the scope of my free, unconstrained action?” Historically, the shift to a modern un-
derstanding of freedom, which dispenses with its natural element, the citizens’ public sphere, 
followed the rise of the theory of individual rights and the growing acceptance of the liberal 
view of society as an aggregate of autonomous, decision-making individuals pursuing their 
own self-interests. It is only logical that once they have established the absolute priority of 
individual (private) freedom the liberals will be mainly preoccupied with safeguarding as 
wide a range of individual rights as possible from the encroachments of the state and other 
institutions of the public domain. 
In spite of all that divides the classic republicans, the liberals and Rousseau, there is, 
at least, one thing they have in common. All of them – Aristotle and Cicero, Locke, and 
Rousseau – subscribe to the following proposition about freedom: free people (citizens) 
have no masters, but they are subject to the law. Yet Rousseau draws from it a diﬀ erent 
set of conclusions than the liberals do. He believes that man cannot be free unless he 
obeys himself alone, acts making use of his own reason and in general remains true to 
himself. Rousseau’s is in fact the democrat’s question, ‘Who rules me?’ rather than the 
liberal unease about the extent of external control over one’s life.  All of his analyses 
invariably start with the idea of man in the primitive state, untouched by civilization 
(l’homme naturel). He explains why it must be so is in his Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality Among Men: 
[…] it is not so much the understanding which creates the speciﬁ c distinction between animals and 
man as it is his quality as a free agent. Nature commands every animal, and the beast obeys. Man 
experiences the same sensation, but he recognizes that he is free to obey or to resist, and it is above 
all in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of his soul reveals itself.7
In his commentary on this passage Robert Spaemann notes that it contains ‘neither any 
reference to Aristotle’s teleological view of nature nor any hint of a possible interrelation 
between nature’s goal and man’s historical existence’, and concludes that Rousseau’s 
conspicuous disregard for the historical man results in “a reverse Carthesianism”.8 
Indeed, the author of Émile is convinced that man’s self-realization, or natural destiny, 
lies in a joyful experience of life. This experience (pur sentiment de l’existence) is like 
an art that one can ‘teach oneself’, but it is not cumulative: “The man who has lived the 
most is not he who has counted the most years but he who has most felt life”.9 Rousseau 
breaks away from the classical concept of nature as something ﬁ xed and static. Yet while 
he leaves behind the substance of the whole Platonic tradition, his method of inquiry is 
7  J.J. Rousseau, Rozprawa o pochodzeniu i podstawach nierówności między ludźmi [Discourse on the 
Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men] [in:] Trzy rozprawy z fi lozofi i społecznej [Three Discourses 
in Social Philosophy], Polish transl. by H. Elzenberg, Warszawa 1956, p. 154 (subsequently referred to as 
Rozprawa o nierówności).
8  R. Spaemann, Rousseau – człowiek czy obywatel. Dylemat nowożytności, Polish translation of Rousseau 
– Mensch oder Bürger: Das Dilemma der Moderne [Stuttgart 2008] by J. Merecki, Warszawa 2011, p. 37. 
9  J.J. Rousseau, Emil, czyli o wychowaniu [Émile, or On Education], Polish transl. by W. Husarski, Vols. 
I–II, Wrocław 1955, p. 15 and 16.
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not dissimilar from Plato’s.10 Like Plato he focuses on an ideal object, i.e. a project of 
a political order which does not exist and can only become reality on condition of a radi-
cal change in man himself. Rousseau’s primary objection is philosophical. He wants to 
re-examine and resolve the conﬂ ict between culture and nature. His approach rests on 
a pair of astounding propositions: that evil is alien to human nature – man is born good 
with a natural desire for harmony – and that vice and error are engendered by institu-
tions of society. This bold political project is not a reform draft but a radical critique of 
the very foundations of the traditional social order. It carries a promise of a new order, 
based on diﬀ erent principles that would help restore a primeval freedom and harmony. 
Let’s now take a look at the main points of this project in which the idea of freedom plays 
a key role.
II
For Rousseau there is no other value as important as freedom, and if we were to identify 
an idea that dominates all his work it would have to be freedom. Rousseau was by no 
means reticent in explaining and discussing it, and yet its critical reception is wrapped 
in argument and never-ending controversies. It is no exaggeration to say that the diver-
sity of interpretations of Rousseau’s concept of freedom is simply staggering. Before 
venturing into that battleﬁ eld, we are going to outline a frame that would embrace all of 
Rousseau’s meanings of freedom and help us situate the most baﬄ  ing or controversial 
points in that ﬁ eld. 
Rousseau himself introduces his multifaceted concept of freedom in a direct and 
comprehensive manner in The Social Contract.11 It is there that we ﬁ nd the characteristic 
epithets that describe three kinds of liberty – natural, social and moral.12 As their very 
sequence reveals the speciﬁ c nature of Rousseau’s understanding of freedom, including 
its tensions and evolution, they will be discussed here in that order.
Natural (or, innate) freedom is the earliest and at the same time most fundamental. It 
belongs to every member of the human race and is an inalienable part of that essential 
humanity which distinguishes man from all other creatures.13 It is this essentialist under-
standing of freedom that separates Rousseau from the liberals. The liberal doctrine re-
duces freedom to a sum and scope of individual rights. In the eyes of Hobbes and Locke 
man has (possesses) freedom and makes use of it to pursue his ends. He can give a part 
of it to somebody else (Locke), or give away all of it (Hobbes) in exchange for some 
10  Cf. J. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory, Cambridge 1969, p. 9–10.
11  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], Polish transl. by A. Peretiatkowicz, Kęty 
2002.
12  Cf. ibidem, p. 23. In the original: liberté naturelle, liberté civile, and liberté morale.
13  For Rousseau “any animal [is] but an ingenious machine, to which nature hath given senses to wind 
itself up, and to guard itself, to a certain degree, against anything that might tend to disorder or destroy 
it. I perceive exactly the same things in the human machine, with this diﬀ erence, that in the operations of 
the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some share in his own operations, in his character as 
a free agent. The one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from an act of free-will”. Cf. Rozprawa 
o nierówności [Discourse on Inequality], p. 153.
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other beneﬁ ts. For Rousseau man is free and cannot trade away even a portion of his 
freedom without suﬀ ering an ontological degradation and dehumanization. The essence 
of enslavement (i.e. the state of being unfree) is the dependence on others in a situation 
when one’s needs are greater than one’s capability to satisfy them. It is exempliﬁ ed in 
the condition of an infant, unable to do without others. A striking development of this 
argument can be found in Émile: 
We were made to be men: laws and society have plunged us once more into childhood. The rich, 
the nobles, the kings are all children who, seeing that men are eager to relieve their misery, derive 
a puerile vanity from that very fact and are very proud of care that one would not give to them if 
they were grown men.14 
In this passage Rousseau turns upside down our perception of the human condition. 
A higher position in the society and an apparently greater power over others lead, ac-
cording to the logic of his argument, to the loss of self-suﬃ  ciency and, in eﬀ ect, to the 
forfeiture of freedom by those who have climbed the social ladder. The famous opening 
sentence of The Social Contract ‘Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains’ is 
more than a statement of fact.15 It is a reminder that not only mankind’s true nature is to 
be free but also that it should be possible to break the chains and return to the realm of 
freedom. 
Eulogies of natural liberty feature most prominently in Rousseau’s two treatises, 
written at the outset of his career, Discours sur les sciences et les arts and Discours 
sur l’origine de l’inégalite parmi les hommes. The former was awarded the ﬁ rst prize 
in a competition of the Académie de Dijon and gained him considerable fame (though 
in the original publication in 1750 he hid behind the sobriquet Un citoyen de Genève).16 
The latter, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, published in 1755, was the product of 
the same mind, and yet, it seems, not unaﬀ ected by the highly polarized reception of its 
predecessor. If the descriptions of the First Discourse seem to indicate that the history of 
mankind actually began in an idyllic state of nature, those of the Second Discourse sug-
gest that the primeval Arcadia is just a hypothesis.17 This modiﬁ cation was most prob-
ably inﬂ uenced by the criticism of his First Discourse, but it did not alter signiﬁ cantly 
Rousseau’s vision of the state of nature. So the speculations he enters into in his Second 
Discourse seem to assume at least a certain degree of reality to the human condition at 
the beginning of time: “religion does not forbid us to draw conjectures solely from the 
nature of man, considered in itself, and from that of the beings which surround him, 
concerning the fate of mankind, had they been left to themselves”.18
The conditional opens up a window on the primeval man, fresh from nature’s mint, 
strong and healthy, because his body is the only wherewithal to supply his needs; he 
14  J.J Rousseau, Emil [Émile], Vol. I, p. 78.
15  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 11.
16  J.J. Rousseau, Rozprawa o naukach i sztukach [Discourse on the Sciences and Arts] [in:] Trzy rozprawy 
z fi lozofi i społecznej [Three Discourses in Social Philosophy], transl. by H. Elzenberg, Warszawa 1956.
17  Cf. Rozprawa o nierówności [Discourse on Inequality], p. 141: “The researches, in which we may 
engage on this occasion, are not to be taken for historical truths, but merely as hypothetical and conditional 
reasonings, ﬁ tter to illustrate the nature of things, than to show their true origin, like those systems, which our 
naturalists daily make of the formation of the world”.
18  J.J. Rousseau, Rozprawa o nierówności [Discourse on Inequality], p. 142.
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is also perfectly happy because he lives fully within his means. Modest needs and the 
capability to satisfy them by one’s own eﬀ orts are the two conditions of perfect free-
dom.19 It goes hand in hand with equality for even if it is admitted that individuals diﬀ er 
from one another (in physical strength, character, etc.) these diﬀ erences are not used as 
a means to establish relationships of dependence and superiority. Thus, what ultimately 
makes Rousseau’s idea of natural liberty special is its exclusive focus on self-suﬃ  ciency, 
reﬂ ected in the self-assuredness of each individual getting on with his life. This freedom 
becomes a means of self-realization and a safeguard of natural self-love (amour de soi), 
a sentiment which keeps at bay all kinds of existential fears and anxieties.20 Endowed 
with such unfailing self-reliance individuals in the state of nature cannot be but friendly 
disposed to everybody. Nor would they do harm to anyone, although their behavior can 
hardly be called moral.21 The only sentiment with a moral ring to it in Rousseau’s state of 
nature is compassion (pitié); it ennobles its subject even if he does not act to help the less 
fortunate and the weak. In general Rousseau’s self-reliant human being does not seek 
the company of other men unless he is compelled to it by natural disasters or hard times. 
Men draw together because they are threatened by nature.22 The cause-eﬀ ect mecha-
nism of that reaction is clear and natural; it is a necessary consequence of man’s de-
pendence on the world of things23 and therefore does not diminish his innate freedom. 
Unfortunately, the transformation of the solitary way of life to one pursued in more per-
manent associations (groups) took mankind down the road of enslavement. The process 
is reconstructed at length in the central part of the Discourse on Inequality (Rousseau 
blames rise of inequality made possible by the growth of social ties for the gradual dis-
appearance of freedom).24 Rather than scrutinize his argument, elaborated and nuanced 
throughout his oeuvre, we will try to identify and outline the constitutive elements of his 
concept of liberty.25 
19  In the state of nature the weak who cannot fend for themselves simply die: “Nature treats them exactly 
in the same manner that Sparta treated the children of her citizens; those who come well formed into the world 
she renders strong and robust, and destroys all the rest”, ibidem, p. 145.
20  Thomas Hobbes writes persuasively about the power of such fears in the state of nature; Rousseau, of 
course, rejects Hobbes’s view outright.
21  If only because morality requires discrimination and the availability of choice between good and evil.
22  The structure of this argument indicates that the conjecture is used as a means to an end – the 
reconstruction of fact, or ‘what must have happened’. Although Rousseau explicitly accords the state of 
nature a hypothetical status, his reasoning not infrequently belies those assurances. His conjectures tend to 
become instruments of deduction and inference, often based on travellers’ accounts of primitive societies.
23  In Emile’s education physical objects are put in the boy’s way to engage him and reawaken in his mind 
the natural understanding of the way the categories of necessity and need operate in nature. Cf. Emil [Émile], 
Vol. I, p. 78 and 84–85. 
24  By establishing a clear, inherent connection between liberty and equality Rousseau became the 
founding father of the democratic tradition, opposed, as a matter of principle, to liberalism with its concept of 
freedom based on the acceptance and respect for inequalities (a no less respectable tradition thanks to ﬁ gures 
like Alexis de Tocqueville). As the system we live in is called ‘liberal democracy’ we should not look away 
from all the theoretical and practical problems, especially the sensitive relationship between equality and 
liberty, that are intrinsic to such a compound.
25  Rousseau restates and develops his main themes in virtually all of his works, using condensed 
formulas and “shorthand” references (to avoid repetition, as he sometimes explains). That practice makes 
interpretation diﬃ  cult because the critic not only has to know all of Rousseau’s writings to see the continuities 
and connections but also has to decide how much of that context is actually relevant. In the case of The Social 
Contract, a relatively short and succinct work, the need to consider its broader contexts seems fairly obvious. 
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So far in this account reason has nowhere been mentioned although for most philoso-
phers it is reason that distinguishes man from the animals. This omission has its own jus-
tiﬁ cation in Rousseau’s thought, not least because he ﬁ nds the relationship between hu-
man nature and reason far more complex than his predecessors.26 “I felt before thinking: 
this is the common fate of humanity”, he wrote in the Confessions.27 At ﬁ rst reason exists 
only as a latent human faculty.28 It can be awakened and activated solely by experience: 
exposed to a stream of stimuli it becomes a tool that enables man to cope much better 
with the challenges of his environment. If it continues to function in that way, guided by 
the natural sentiments (happiness resulting from being free and natural self-love), it may 
become man’s most precious implement in his struggle to supply his real needs. Used 
properly, reason should serve the purpose of self-improvement. However, it can also 
easily change course – to use a modern distinction – and become more preoccupied with 
‘having’ than ‘being’.29 Or, because of its potential for deviation, ‘the mind depraves the 
senses’.30 As a result man gradually loses touch with nature and is no longer able to enjoy 
the true happiness that comes with freedom. Since, however, he still feels the need to be 
happy, he begins to look for other means of satisfying that desire. And, in a world where 
interpersonal relations have become more intense, he discovers that what he relishes 
most is other people.31 That process, replicated on a large scale, triggers oﬀ  rivalries 
and gives rise to new, unnatural (hence fatal to freedom) feelings. They include envy, 
ambition, and a haunting fear of not being able to satisfy one’s needs. The destruction of 
the harmonious world of the state of nature is further accelerated by the establishment 
of private property, and especially the private ownership of land (transition to a settled 
life form cemented the ties between individuals and ushered in the new epoch of civil 
society). Rousseau captures that moment in a graphic description:
The ﬁ rst man, who, after enclosing a piece of ground, took it into his head to say, “This is mine”, 
and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many 
crimes, how many wars, how many murders, how many misfortunes and horrors, would that man 
26  He states unequivocally in Discourse on Inequality that what distinguishes man from other creatures 
is not reason, but freedom. Cf. Rozprawa o nierówności [Discourse on Inequality] p. 152.
27  J.J. Rousseau, Wyznania [Confessions], Vol. I, Polish translation by T. Boy-Żeleński, Warszawa 1931, 
p. 36. The claim that reason (as well as language and writing) is secondary to feelings and the ‘truth of the 
heart’ is repeated time and again in Rousseau’s works and correspondence. He also appeals to his readers to 
study his words not for their argumentative content but in the context of the author’s personality, including 
his private life. Cf. J. Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Przejrzystość i przeszkoda oraz siedem esejów 
o Rousseau, Polish translation by J. Wojcieszak of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, la transparence et l’obstacle. 
suivi de Sept essais sur Rousseau [Paris 1971], Warszawa 2000.
28  This is why Rousseau is so critical of paedagogical philosophies, including that of Locke, which 
regarded the child as a ‘little adult’ whose reason only waits to be activated. Nor does he think much 
of education understood as the transmission of knowledge. Rousseau is a great believer of education as 
an upbringing which exposes the pupil to direct sensory experience. The truth should be felt before it is 
interpreted. 
29  A distinction made by Gabriel Marcel, and developed by Erich Fromm. Cf. E. Fromm, Mieć czy być?, 
Polish transl. by J. Karłowski of To Have or To Be [New York 1976] Poznań 1989.
30  J.J. Rousseau, Rozprawa o nierówności [Discourse on Inequality], p. 152.
31  Or more precisely, one is impressed by the things that other people surround themselves with or 
can make or do. It would make one happy, i.e. satisfy one’s needs, to be able to have them. The ensuing 
appropriation and possession can then function as a source and an index of happiness. Its connection with 
“things” makes it more tangible than an inner feeling of happiness that cannot be checked or measured.
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have saved the human species, who pulling up the stakes or ﬁ lling up the ditches should have cried 
to his fellows: Be sure not to listen to this imposter […].32 
Although the author of the Discourse on Inequality does not acknowledge it, the ﬁ rst 
who said ‘This is mine’ was Locke’s natural man. 
In fact, both philosophers describe the history of mankind in a similar manner, but 
disagree strongly in their evaluation of that process. Contrary to Locke, Rousseau sees 
in the increase of rational co-operation aimed at maximizing individual proﬁ t both a sign 
and proof of man’s degeneration. In this type of co-operation joint endeavours and 
friendly collaboration is replaced with brutal competition, barely disguised by networks 
of mutual dependency. Natural amour de soi is supplanted by amour-propre, self-love 
which depends on the opinion of others. The latter concept chimes in with both the 
Christian tradition – where it is a synonym of the various manifestations of pride, from 
showing oﬀ  to the desire of being equal to God (so for instance in Pascal who was highly 
esteemed by Rousseau) – and the moral critique of private property (the connection is 
reinforced by the word propre, “one’s own”), and in particular the never-ending growth 
of perceived individual needs that spurs everybody to accumulate more and more to 
fulﬁ ll them.
If we accept the premises of Rousseau’s description of natural freedom, we can hard-
ly disagree that the drive to accumulate property (especially landed property) must doom 
everybody to bondage. I can either increase my wealth by my own labour – which means 
that I have to work harder, an unnecessary exertion from the point of view of satisfaction 
of my natural needs.33 Alternately, I can use other people’s labour, but that requires bring-
ing them under my power – which means that the burden of unfreedom which weighs 
even heavier on everybody (including me for the increased dependence on others is the 
reverse of my own enfeeblement). A pessimistic conclusion is thus unescapable: the 
price for the emergence of society is paid in human degradation. Moreover, all its prod-
ucts (the state, its institutions and its law) got tainted the moment they were born. The 
blame for this calamitous development falls for the most part on ill-used rational minds. 
This conclusion will have far-reaching implications for Rousseau’s political theory. To 
make sure that his projected state is not undermined by individuals pursuing their own 
advantage he introduces the corrective measure of the general will. It is a rational com-
mon interest which takes shape in the process of clearing the body politic from the im-
purities of selﬁ sh and sectional interests.34
32  J.J. Rousseau, Rozprawa o nierówności [Discourse on Inequality], p. 186.
33  They are not only unnecessary but also oppressive. If one’s needs are kept within bounds, there is 
room for a ‘natural idleness’ (l’oisiveté) that Rousseau was very fond of. He speaks in praise of otium on 
numerous occasions, as for example in his Essay on the Origin of Languages (O pochodzeniu języków, Polish 
transl, by B. Banasiak, Kraków 2001, p. 61); the Confessions (Wyznania, Vol. II, p. 447); and the Reveries 
of the Solitary Walker (Przechadzki samotnego marzyciela, Polish transl. by M. Gniewiewska, Warszawa 
1967, p. 186). Rousseau’s l’oisiveté is not so much “doing nothing” as doing that which gives one immediate 
satisfaction. So he would certainly appreciate recreational sports and physical activities that help you stay 
ﬁ t, but would spare no good word for competitive sports in which exertion is a means to obtain delayed 
gratiﬁ cation (medals, trophies, prestige, etc.). 
34  At this point it is worth mentioning one of Rousseau less known works, though by no means 
unimportant – Lettres écrites de la montagne (Letters Written from the Mountain) published in 1764 r., 
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Rousseau believed that in his day people all over the world were in bondage – both 
the aristocrats who assumed they were the privileged master class as well as those who 
were compelled to obey and serve. The only man alive in that all too human world was 
Jean Jacque Rousseau himself.35 Yet he found little satisfaction in savouring the taste of 
freedom all alone. Determined to reach out to others with his emancipatory message, he 
embarked on a grand political project even though it meant abandoning philosophy for 
political philosophy and legal theory. It was no easy task. If natural freedom was set up 
as a criterion of true humanity, its essential characteristics had to be kept intact. Yet, at 
the same time it had to be adjusted to ﬁ t a humanity that had moved from an amoral and 
asocial state of nature to a new social and moral life form. We can ﬁ nd out most about 
that project from The Social Contract, though nearly as important are his Considerations 
on the Government of Poland and the Constitutional Project for Corsica.36 More insights 
can be gained from the Reveries of the Solitary Walker and, of course, Émile, or On 
Education. Although Rousseau’s ground-breaking project was extraordinarily interest-
ing on the level of theory, its implementation in the real world soon ran into grave dif-
ﬁ culties, both philosophical (or even logical) and practical. 
First of all, Rousseau had to tackle the “problem of a new beginning”, a stumbling 
block of all radical visionaries who decried the suppression of ‘true’ human nature by 
the established order and called for its replacement by a new reality, cleansed of old 
falsehoods.37 The questions any revolutionary project has to answer refer to the method 
and the chances of a successful transition from the bad old system to the new one. A step-
by-step reform is ruled out in principle (it is a revolution) and to avoid instability the new 
order must not be built on old foundations. However, the postulate of a total break with 
the status quo opens the revolutionary to the charge of ignoring the empirical conditions 
upon which the success of the revolution will depend; indeed, it is reasonable to expect 
that a successful introduction of a new order will not be possible unless it comes deus 
ex machina in the form of a new state. This conundrum looks too hard to crack, and 
Rousseau is no better at solving it than anybody else. It is echoed in the hesitations of 
the founders of modern republics: can they give the legislative functions into the hands 
of the citizens or should they rather have the fundamental principles and primary norms 
cast in stone by expert jurists.
Another diﬃ  culty which besets all attempt at formulating a credible political project 
on the basis of Rousseau’s philosophical blueprint concerns the relationship between the 
state of nature and the new social order. His nostalgic evocations of the ideals of clas-
sical antiquity suggests that the call ‘return to nature’ could be treated almost literally 
as an attempt to revive the simple life and austere value system from the beginnings of 
especially Letter VI, which outlines the main points of The Social Contract; http://www.rousseauonline.ch/
pdf/rousseauonline-0028.pdf [access: 12 December 2015].
35  The civilized society had no room for “the natural man” and replaced him with a “human man”, or 
l’homme de l’homme. Cf. B. Baczko, Rousseau: samotność i wspólnota, Warszawa 1964, p. 141ﬀ  [Rousseau, 
solitude et communauté, French transl. by C. Brendhel-Lamhout, Paris 1974].
36  J.J. Rousseau, Projekt konstytucji dla Korsyki [Constitutional Project for Corsica], Polish transl. by 
M. Blaszke, Warszawa 2009.
37  It was a problem encountered earlier by Plato. After the implementation of the project of his ideal state 
in Syracuse ended in failure, he went to work on “a second best” system. The abandonment of the original 
project illustrates the vulnerability of grand theories confronted with empirical reality.
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European civilization. This interpretation is made plausible by numerous passages from 
his work where he eulogizes the simple farmer, whose life and work is closest to the ideal 
of supplying one’s needs in a natural way, the pleasures of ‘natural idleness’, and the pas-
toral joys of communal rustic celebrations. Yet, Rousseau’s work is also open to another 
interpretation, skeptical of the ‘return’ imperative or the epitomic importance of classical 
antiquity. This alternate interpretation insists that central to Rousseau’s project is the idea 
of uniting discordant individuals in a state in which the pooled human potential would 
be used to create an ideal civil society. Rousseau’s state would then mark a new chapter 
in the history of mankind, bringing people back from the wasteland of civilization onto 
the path of good life and true morality. This is, for example, the gist of Immanuel Kant’s 
reading of the intentions of the author of The Social Contract. Not surprisingly the dis-
parities between rival interpretations of Rousseau’s thought make the task of clarifying 
the relationship between various types of liberty all the more diﬃ  cult. So, depending on 
one’s interpretative stance, it is possible to see moral freedom as the recovered natural 
freedom (on the premise that for Rousseau the word freedom always has the same mean-
ing, while the adjectives merely describe the conditions of its realization), or, to treat 
each of the three liberties as an element in a graded sequence (moral freedom would then 
be the fullest or the perfect type of liberty). 
The problems of interpreting Rousseau’s thought are in a way insurmountable, and 
yet it continues to attract new research. What perhaps all of his devotees and critics need 
to remember is that Rousseau himself readily admitted to incoherence, and even treated 
it as a virtue. He believed that reason is incapable of explaining the nuances of the hu-
man condition and studying it in a systematic way, step by step, only adds to the apparent 
confusion. The pursuit of truth must combine rational analytical discourse and universal 
empathy. In short, to develop an understanding of Rousseau we have to – before any-
thing else – get a feeling of what he had to say. Analysis has to go hand in hand with an 
apprehension of the whole. 
The tenets of Rousseau’s political philosophy are well known. He believes that the 
state came into being as a result of contract, but unlike other contractualists he insists 
that it can in no way limit the freedom of individuals since the goal of the contract is to 
protect their freedom. In his state power is exercised according to the rule of law.38 The 
Rousseauian republic is a democracy – its citizens enjoy the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom and equality – but in respect it diﬀ ers signiﬁ cantly from the classical model 
of that form of government. Whereas in ancient Athens the sovereignty of the people 
(democracy) was exercised by majority rule, in Rousseau’s republic that sovereignty 
is manifested in the general will, which does not depend directly on numbers. Even 
though there are few ideas as contested as la volonté générale, and dispite the fact that 
the author himself found it diﬃ  cult to explain what exactly he meant by that phrase, it 
38  Rousseau explains that the name “republic” (res publica can be translated as “commonwealth”) does 
not determine the system of government – it can be a democracy or a monarchy as long as it guarantees 
the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The latter, according to Rousseau, is indivisible even if th 
competences of government are departmentalized. So, for example, in the right type of monarchy the king 
and his administration are public servants (and not the sovereign). Cf. J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The 
Social Contract], p. 36.
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guarantees the integrity of Rousseau’s concept of freedom.39 It also guarantees the conti-
nuity between the innate freedom from the state of nature and the novel social freedom. 
Moreover, it helps us understand why Rousseau, who always looked for inspiration to 
classical antiquity, praised Athens, but was partial to Sparta. 
For Rousseau subjection to the will of any other person, even if that person knows 
better what is good, amounts to bondage or enslavement (both words refer to the same, 
undiﬀ erentiated condition of unfreedom). The act of bowing to the will of the majority 
is no diﬀ erent, at least in the light of his black-and-white approach. Were we to nuance 
his stark binary opposition by bringing in a term like ‘domination’ (or more precisely 
‘fear of domination’), the list of Rousseau’s liberties could be expanded by adding one 
more, the republican freedom. In general, however, the introduction of the general will, 
regardless of its republican connections, is good strategy. It allows Rousseau to avoid 
the charge that to construct his state he has compromised one of his fundamental ideas 
– the tenet that drives the argument of the Discourse on Inequality and makes for the 
originality of the educational project in Émile. While the great majority of his critics get 
absorbed by the problems that surround the idea of la volonté générale, they tend to over-
look its role in maintaining the overall consistence of Rousseau’s philosophy. 
The premise that you cannot give up your freedom without giving up your humanity 
is also crucial to Rousseau’s formula of the social contract, which stands in direct oppo-
sition to the absolutist conceptions of Hobbes and Grotius. Rousseau insists that proper 
protection of everybody’s freedom and property requires a special form of association 
that should “enable each member of the group to obey only himself and to remain as 
free as before”. This stipulation went down well and even became, nota bene, an inspi-
ration for Immanuel Kant’s concept of moral autonomy. However, neither liberals nor 
conservatives could possibly approve Rousseau stipulating “the total alienation of each 
associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the ﬁ rst place, as 
each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no 
one has any interest in making them burdensome to others”.40 The society created by 
a pact of all by all should lay down conditions that will be the same for all the contract-
ing parties; it is a common and moral body politic whose unity will be guaranteed by the 
general will. It leaves no room for any individual or personal rights that would under-
mine its unity; nothing must stand between the individual and the whole. Thus, the new 
commonalty is neither a nominalist society nor an aggregate of individuals, but a ‘public 
person’ endowed with a will of its own. 
In regard to freedom two clauses of the contract are absolutely crucial. The ﬁ rst ex-
plains that its terms “when they are well understood, can be reduced to a single stipula-
tion: the individual member alienates himself totally to the whole community together 
39  This assessment does not imply that even that element of Rousseau’s project can be found coherent. 
If anything, the opposite is true. His attempts to explain how the general will manifests itself and how can 
be sure that it is the general will (since numbers, or the vote count, are immaterial) simply abound with 
consistencies. Cf. F. Neuhouser, Freedom, Dependence and the General Will, “Philosophical Review” 
1993, Vol. 102, p. 363–395 and G. Sreenivasan, What is the General Will?, “Philosophical Review” 
2000, Vol. 109, p. 545–581.
40  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 20–21.
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with all his rights”.41 If things had been left it at that, Rousseau’s state would have dif-
fered little from Hobbes’s Leviathan. But Rousseau goes further to declare that “each 
man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody […] as there is no associate over 
whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself”.42 The mean-
ing of the social contract can be explained metaphorically by the following two-act story. 
In the ﬁ rst round a group of people pour their individual freedoms into a communal 
bowl where they get mixed and lose their individual character and in the second round 
everybody is given back an equal portion of the stuﬀ  in of the bowl. In eﬀ ect, each per-
son gets back as much freedom as he has given away, the same in substance, but not the 
same in so far as it is a blend. It contains the freeedoms of everyone else, and the original 
freedom is dispersed in all members of the body politic (the sovereign). Thus, a citizen 
who stands up for his new freedom defends the freedom of all and can expect everyone 
else to join him.43 Provided the pooling and management of individual resources is well 
organized, the new state will greatly beneﬁ t all its citizens by maximizing the means of 
overall need satisfaction and the means of securing everybody’s freedom.
Whereas in the state of nature there is a multitude of individual wills, in the new state 
individual wills combine and blend to produce a single, general will.44 It is general in two 
senses: it is derived from each individual will, and at the same time as the general will 
it resides in every citizen. From the philosophical point of view the distinction is clear, 
but it is not at all easy to translate it into the language of politics and law. This situation 
has prompted a great deal of critical comments blaming Rousseau, often rightly, for 
opaqueness or inconsistency. The issue that has attracted most doubts is the emergence 
of the general will in the new state. According to Rousseau the general will is neither 
the will of the majority nor even the will of all, though he seems to care for numbers. 
He believes that under the good laws the citizens of the new state will be conditioned to 
feel and judge in a similar manner until their hearts and minds act in complete uniformi-
ty.45 However, he also believes that the good laws must come from a distinguished and wise 
Legislator who 
ought to feel himself capable, so to speak, of changing human nature; of transforming each indi-
vidual, who is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole […] and of 
substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence nature has 
conferred on us all.46
His position in the state should be deﬁ ned by “neither magistracy, nor sovereignty”, 
but his sense of mission.47 Interestingly, Rousseau did not hesitate to take on the role of 
the legislator himself when in all seriousness he decided to write a draft constition for 
41  Ibidem, p. 19.
42  Ibidem.
43  The way in which the community exerts pressure on all and everybody to make them free can perhaps 
be explained by analogy to the phenomenon of level equalization in communicating containers, regardless of 
their shape or size. The liquid reaches each vessel and ﬁ lls it up to the same level.
44  J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book IV, Part 1. 
45  Rousseau treats equality – as a condition of freedom – downright literally. He believes rightly that 
it grows as people begin to look like one another not because of their actions, but because of what they are. 
46  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 37.
47  Ibidem, p. 38.
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Corsica.48 Later however he would call it his Utopia, which implies that he grew skepti-
cal about the project.49
There are more discrepancies in Rousseau’s presentation of the general will, but there 
is no need to discuss them here. Instead, let’s consider the consequences of incorporating 
the general will in law regardless of the manner in which it has been done. The signa-
tories of the contract are now cast in a double role: they participate in government (and 
as citizens constitute the sovereign) and at the same time they are subject to the law.50 
This formal dualism determines the nature of the social freedom, which, in conformity 
with contemporary trends, could as well be called ‘republican’ freedom.51 As Rousseau 
explains the transition from natural freedom to social freedom requires the renunciation 
of “an unlimited right to everything one tries to get and succeeds in getting” in return 
for the aid of the general will and “the proprietorship of all he possesses”.52 He sees the 
transition as a kind of exchange involving compensations (ie. compensation, reparation 
for loss or damage). The use of that word suggests that the balance of one’s rights does 
not change after joining the community. At the same time we are told unequivocally 
that social freedom is limited by the general will. It could mean that social freedom is 
attached not to citizenship but to the role of the subject of the law. The diﬀ erence is im-
portant. Qua citizen I can participate in the process of ﬁ nding out the general will, which 
‘is always right’.53 In the character of the subject my duty is to obey. However, owing 
to the overlap of the two roles, at a deeper, ontological level the subject’s obedience is 
identical with freedom itself. Any other conclusion would be open to contradiction as 
one may ask how a person unable to control oneself can be called free.
Social freedom manifests itself in obedience to the law even if individual self-interest 
or one’s understanding of a given situation prompts noncompliance. Rousseau’s answer 
to doubters and dissidents is uncompromising: “whoever refuses to obey the general will 
shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will 
be forced to be free”.54 
Compelling people to be free may be necessary, especially in the early days of the 
new state. It is so because “our will is always for our own good, but we do not always 
see what that is”.55 Besides, after a long phase of retrogression, the return to a nature can-
not be easy or free from occasional setbacks.56 They, however, must not be allowed to 
48  The intriguing circumstances that led to the writing of this book are discussed by Marek Blaszke in his 
Introduction to J.-J. Rousseau, Projekt konstytucji dla Korsyki [Constitutional Project for Corsica], p. 7–36. 
49  Ibidem, p. 17. More on this point in Chapter VI titled “Freedom and utopia” in B. Baczko’s Rousseau: 
samotność i wspólnota [Rousseau, solitude et communauté].
50  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 20.
51  Rousseau uses the term liberté civile; the standard English equivalent is ‘civil liberty’. However, in 
contemprary contexts this phrase can all too readily be associated with just a bundle of civil rights, aka the 
ﬁ rst-generation human rights. So, to foreground the broader meaning of Rousseau’s term we have decided 
to use the phrase “social freedom”, following the Polish translation of the Social Contract and some English 
texts. 
52  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 23. 
53  Ibidem, p. 28.
54  Ibidem, p. 22.
55  Ibidem, p. 28.
56  Here “return to nature” equals “restoration of man’s untarnished nature” rather than going back to the 
state of nature.
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disrupt the functioning of the whole community. People’s long-standing cultural habits 
cannot be changed in a day; nor will it easy to bring their passions, fed by amour-propre, 
or their selﬁ sh reasoning under the healing sway of natural feelings. Rousseau knows 
very well that man’s character is the product of upbringing, which in virtually all human 
societies is riddled with falsehood and error. Therefore one cannot expect that people 
will put away their old habits in no time at all. In the ﬁ ght for freedom it is not enough to 
rebel against enslavement; it is necessary to make sure that nobody (i.e. any of the new 
citizens) is allowed to wreck what has already been won. The relationship between the 
state and the individual in Rousseau’s doctrine can best be illustrated by analogy to the 
teacher–pupil relationship in Émile. There the tutor commits himself to respect, above all 
else, the freedom of his pupil, and yet keeps exposing all his faults and weaknesses with 
absolute frankness. A similar ambivalence inheres in the conduct of the Rousseauian 
state: it is committed to the protection of the freedom of its citizens while at same time 
keeps them in dependence on itself. Before examining the implications of that observa-
tion (which seem to conﬁ rm the judgments of Rousseau’s liberal critics), let us pause 
over a claim which reveals a great deal about Rousseau’s own approach. As Émile’s tutor 
is told to keep the child dependent only on things, things are essential in maintainting 
the dependence of the individual on the state. The proof of the importance of things at 
all levels of Rousseau’s political project can be found in the following quotation from 
Émile:
If the laws of nations could, like those of nature, have an inﬂ exibility that no human force could 
ever conquer, dependence on men would then become dependence on things again; in the republic 
all of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil state, and freedom 
which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises him to virtue.57
The goal of a teacher is to help a child develop aptitudes that would assist it on the 
road to maturity and the fullness of humanity. The state’s role with respect to its citizens 
is similar. It may be noted here that Rousseau’s chief political concern is the develop-
ment-enhancing functions of the state: it manifests itself in his favourite themes, e.g. the 
principle of federalism which strengthens society’s self government, the advantages of 
direct democracy, institutions of the Roman Republic, and the usefulness of civil reli-
gion. The common characteristic of all the concrete measures he endorses is that they 
motivate individuals to participate in public life. 
Thanks to active participation in the life of the community social freedom in which 
every citizen shares, but which he, as a subject, can view (and often views) as external 
coercion, may in time become moral freedom, the most perfect of all other kinds of 
freedom. Its impact on man is summed up in this key quotation: “[it is] moral liberty, 
which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is 
slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty”.58 Although 
Rousseau does not write a lot about moral freedom, it is the keystone of his philosophy 
of freedom. 
Moral freedom does not emerge spontaneously in a well-organized state. It takes root 
gradually in conjunction with the operations of the general will. The latter works stead-
57  J.J. Rousseau, Emil [Émile], p. 78.
58  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 23.
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ily but needs time to eliminate the errors accumulated over the long history of mankind 
and enable each individual to regain its original, true human nature. It should even, in 
a sense, change it without impairing its freedom. At any rate freedom (natural or moral) 
invariably remains Rousseau’s driving force aﬀ ecting the balance of needs and means 
of their satisfaction. While in the state of nature the individual had to restrain his needs 
to ﬁ t his limited capabilities, the cumulate resources of the new state can satisfy more 
needs more eﬀ ectively. The momentum, which “makes social union invincible”,59 also 
makes all individuals, even the idlers, want to be a part of it. In the state of nature idle-
ness was freedom’s ally in so far as it dampened ambition and helped preserve equality. 
In the new republic equality is protected by law while idleness can no longer be justiﬁ ed. 
Rousseau explains:
Outside the pale of society, the solitary, owing nothing to any man, may live as he pleases, but in 
society either he lives at the cost of others, or he owes them in labour the cost of his keep; there is 
no exception to this rule. Man in society is bound to work; rich or poor, weak or strong, every idler 
is a thief.60
The same conviction is expressed in Rousseau’s draft constitution for Corsica: “Men 
are naturally lazy: but ardour in labour is the ﬁ rst-fruit of a well-regulated society”.61
After reaching the phase of moral freedom, the individual “regains itself”, i.e. re-
gains a sense of control over the use of one’s freedom in relations with other people. It 
becomes, in Starobinski’s most pertinent phrase, ‘totally transparent’ to others, a condi-
tion that enables its inner nature – virtue, freedom, truth – to shine out.62 According to 
Rousseau, the ethics of virtue should supplant the old amoral idleness. The idealized 
worthies of classical antiquity supplied him with what he thought was the right educa-
tional model. What must have appealed to him about the classical ethos, very diﬀ erent 
from both modern individualism and organicism, was its combination of a sense of be-
longing to the political community with an emphasis on individual responsibility for its 
continued existence. Increasing the greatness of the community as a whole by encourag-
ing closer co-operation of its individual members was never Rousseau’s civil ideal. The 
new, well-organized state could be expected to grow more powerful, but this was a mat-
ter of secondary importance; the state’s primary goal was to oﬀ er everybody a chance 
of self-realization.63 Rousseau’s concern with the creation of conditions that would put 
the communal might of the state at the service of its individual members indicates that 
his whole project must be seen as a great and passionate defence of individuality.64 Both 
the tenor and the drift of his argumentation clearly show that his perception of the body 
59  Ibidem, p. 32.
60  J.J. Rousseau, Emil [Émile], p. 241. The radicalism of these words is hard to overestimate; at that time 
in many European coutries a nobleman who would take up manual work for a living (“get his hands dirty”) 
risked the forfeiture of his title.
61  J.J. Rousseau, Projekt konstytucji dla Korsyki [Constitutional Project for Corsica], p. 123.
62  J. Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 64.
63  It was already noted by Immanuel Kant. More on that in: R. Grimsley, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: 
A Study in Self-Awareness, Cardiﬀ  1961.
64  In the sense (freedom and space to develop one’s own character) given to it by, among others, Alexis 
de Tocqueville, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and John Stuart Mill.
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politic is expressly individualistic.65 As a result, we cannot be anything but skeptical 
about those critics of Rousseau’s work that ﬁ nd him guilty of advocating collectivism, or 
worse.66 It is another matter how seriously such a project should be treated (apart from 
being a visionary ideal). It seems that Rousseau wanted to show that he was in earnest, 
both when he got down to work to reform the institutions of an already existing state (as 
in his Considerations on the Government of Poland) and when he thought up a com-
pletely new constitution (as in the case of Corsica). Quite a number of his intuitions 
have been reanimated in modern republicanism even if not all neorepublicans are ready 
to admit him into their club. Undoubtedly, what many still ﬁ nd attractive in Rousseau’s 
doctrine is his abhorrence of being dominated by others. He makes his point very clear 
in Letters Written from the Mountains:
Many attempts have been made to confuse independence and liberty. These two things are so dif-
ferent that they are even mutually exclusive. When each does as he pleases, he often does what 
displeases others, and that is not what is called a free state. Liberty consists less in doing one’s will 
than in not being subject to someone else’s.67 
Against Aristotle, Rousseau avers that man by nature is not a social animal, but he agrees 
with Hobbes that the political community is not natural. At the same time though, he rejects 
Hobbes’s view of man as a rational egoist, always bent on maximizing one’s own interest. 
Rousseau, on the contrary, believes that there is nothing to prevent man from becoming 
a good citizen in the right kind of society, especially when his upbringing and education is 
oriented towards citizenship. A society cannot survive unless its citizens have empathy for 
others (merely pursuing one’s interest is not enough) and ﬁ nd the fulﬁ lment of civic duties 
indispensable for their own good (or, to borrow Hobbes’s term – for their own survival). 
Anybody who has read Émile cannot help but realize that only education ensures social 
unity. It has to be an education which promotes solidarity and the virtues of civic partici-
pation along the lines of Rousseau’s grand political project.68 Unlike Hobbes or Locke, 
Rousseau connects the transition to the civil state with a radical change in man ‘by 
substituting a feeling of righteousness for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions 
the morality they… formerly lacked’.69 The emergence of the new community prompts 
a moral change in its individual members and that in turn enables the community to 
65  Cf. J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 21: “the Sovereign, being
formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary
to theirs”.
66  I.e. totalitarianism, if we are to believe the argument of Karl Popper or Jacob L. Talmon. It seems 
that most of the misunderstandings result from attempts to refute the theoretical foundations of Rousseau’s 
doctrine by demonstrating how his state would have to function in practice. In each case the meaning of the 
phrase ‘would have to’ is construed with reference to the Nazi and communist regimes of the 20th century 
(which begs the question if a regime of this kind was imaginable in Rousseau’s time). 
67  J.J. Rousseau, Lettres écrites de la montagne, p. 220.
68  J.J. Rousseau, Emil [Émile], p. 78: “The natural man lives for himself; he is the unit, the whole, 
dependent only on himself and on his like. The citizen is but the numerator of a fraction, whose value depends 
on its denominator; his value depends upon the whole, that is, on the community. Good social institutions are 
those best ﬁ tted to make a man unnatural, to exchange his independence for dependence, to merge the unit in 
the group, so that he no longer regards himself as one, but as a part of the whole, and is only conscious of the 
common life”. Cf. also M. Qvortrup, The Political Philosophy, p. 31–34.
69  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 24–25.
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achieve its goal, the triumph of equality and freedom from domination. This will be pos-
sible only if people arrive at the right understanding of freedom, the essence of which 
is an accord between individual will and the general will. Rousseau calls this accord 
virtue.70 He equates the rule of virtue with the rule of true freedom, and adds that virtue 
must be combined with the feeling of patriotism:
There can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty without virtue, no virtue without citizens; cre-
ate citizens, and you have everything you need; without them, you will have nothing but debased 
slaves, from the rulers of the State downwards. To form citizens is not the work of a day; and in 
order to have men it is necessary to educate them when they are children […]. Public education, 
therefore, under regulations prescribed by the government, and under magistrates established by the 
Sovereign, is one of the fundamental rules of popular or legitimate government.71
Clearly, Rousseau’s principal concern is the creation of a social order in which no-
body is subjected to arbitrary will. Should this project fail, the individual is left with 
a stark choice. If he joins an ill-organized society and accepts its rules, he will lead a life 
of enslavement. He may not admit it, enjoy the illusory prosperity, but the iron chains 
draped with garlands of ﬂ owers will not cease to be chains.72 For Rousseau the things that 
appear to promise a better life – power, prestige, riches – are just a burden we could well 
dispense with. We do not really need them because, as he muses in Émile,
[…] man is the same in every station; the rich man’s stomach is no bigger than the poor man’s, nor 
is his digestion any better; the master’s arm is neither longer nor stronger than the slave’s; a great 
man is no taller than one of the people.73
By taking the other option, i.e. backing oﬀ  and refusing to co-operate with a corrupt 
society, an individual resigns himself to self-imposed solitude. That way of life oﬀ ers 
a diﬀ erent variant of freedom. “I never believed that man’s liberty consisted in doing that 
he wished, but chieﬂ y in never doing that e did not wish”, Rousseau writes in Reveries 
of the Solitary Walker.74 At any rate, in a corrupt society a free man cannot do much. The 
only ‘true’ freedom he can exercise (which does not impair his humanity) is natural free-
dom whose obverse is natural inertia (idleness). That is why in a sum-up of his free life 
Rousseau can say proudly: “I have done little good, I allow; but harm never once in my 
life entered my will, and I doubt whether there exists a man who really has done less than 
myself”.75 Moral freedom – associated with autonomy and achievable only after a radi-
cal transformation of natural freedom – needs citizenship for its very existence. Just as 
Rousseau’s well-organized state, by deﬁ nition, needs citizens who are devoted to the 
performance of their duties and who put their full trust in the authorities; and in which, 
ideally, good public morals (moeurs) will replace the genius of leaders while virtue will 
be appreciated more than talent.76 The development of a virtuous citizenry, which is the 
70  J.J. Rousseau, Ekonomia polityczna [A Discourse on Political Economy] [in:] Trzy rozprawy z fi lozofi i 
społecznej [Three Discourses in Social Philosophy], p. 300.
71  Ibidem, ss. 311, 313.
72  J.J. Rousseau, Rozprawa o naukach i sztukach [Discourse on the Sciences and Arts], p. 12.
73  J.J. Rousseau, Emil [Émile], p. 238.
74  J.J. Rousseau, Przechadzki samotnego marzyciela [Reveries of the Solitary Walker], p. 113.
75  Ibidem, p. 113.
76  J. Delaney, Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue, London 2006, p. 107ﬀ .
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ﬁ nal stage of Rousseau’s project, requires not only a change of mental habits but also 
a radical change of heart. This leads us to the conclusion that Rousseau’s ideal of repub-
lical freedom consists of a union of moral freedom and virtue while ideal body politic 
is based on a harmony of obedience and freedom. In that new reality ‘the words subject 
and sovereign are identical correlatives the idea of which meets in the single word “citi-
zen”. This concept paves the way for Kant’s formula of moral autonomy founded on an 
individual appropriation of moral law. Rousseau knows that his vision of a great trans-
formation of man and society may fail, yet, unlike Plato, he does not think of preparing 
an alternative, second-best project. For Rousseu it’s make or break. 
III
Rousseau’s work has invited multiple readings and interpretations. Here we will con-
centrate on a few, more recent ones, that show the complexity of Rousseau’s argument 
about freedom and the multiplicity of perspectives taken up by the critics. Let us begin 
with one or two points that are uncontested, namely that Rousseau’s faith in the republic 
and in the ability of individuals to take responsibility for themselves and for the commu-
nity marks his break with the modern consensus. It was a break both with Hobbes who 
believed that the renunciation of individual autonomy was necessary price to be paid for 
society’s peace and security and with Locke, Madison and Montesquieu who advocated 
the separation of powers, judicial control and federalism as the best antidote against the 
misuse of political power. Rousseau, who believed that the abuse of power can best be 
curbed by the people themselves guided by the general will, was certainly not an insti-
tutionalist. In his view the functioning of the body politic depends on the right balance 
between obedience and freedom. The harmony between the two principles is a guarantee 
of protection to everybody without the intervention of the will or the total subjection to 
others because “where right and liberty are everything inconveniences are nothing”.77 
The establishment of such a harmony, which the Moderns ignored, requires “an explana-
tion of the true nature of man and on that basis determine the characteristics of a good 
political system”.78 Consequently, his concept of freedom must not be discussed sepa-
rately from his concept of nature. In the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns 
Rousseau is generally believed to have been on the side of the latter. Like the Ancients he 
was convinced freedom and equality could only be reconciled in a political system based 
on virtue, i.e. “being a good citizen”.79 For him the primary political objective is not se-
curity, but the good life (the restoration of freedom) which should be promoted by means 
of an austere moral education. However, that does not take us to the root of Rousseau’s 
radicalism. It lies in his rejection – with the Moderns – of some of the fundamentals of 
the ancient philosophers’ creed, namely that man is destined by nature to live in a politi-
77  J.J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], p. 113.
78  A. Bloom, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau”, in: Historia fi lozofi i politycznej, ed. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, 
Polish transl. by P. Nowak of History of Political Philosophy [Chicago 1987], Warszawa 2010, p. 567.
79  Ibidem, p. 569.
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cal community, that he is both a social and political being, and that living this kind of life 
is sanctioned by reason. His argument is built on a diﬀ erent cornerstone, a reconstruction 
of the natural man (“take men as they are”). This construction, as Allan Bloom argues 
in his interpretation of the author of The Social Contract, provides both the background 
and the foundation of Rousseau’s concept of freedom, conceived as a state or condition 
in which man is simply at one with himself and has the potential to delovelop in many 
diﬀ erent directions.80
Another thought-provoking study of Rousseau’s political thought is Joshua Cohen’s 
Rousseau: Free Community of Equals, published in 2010. It revisits Rousseau’s project 
of a political order with its extraordinary moral credentials, ie. promises to everybody 
that their interests, personal dignity and individual autonomy would be fully protected. 
At the heart of the new order, or as Cohen dubs it Free Community of Equals, is the 
principle of autonomy (self-legislation), which enables the participants to regain man’s 
original freedom.81 Rousseau’s grand design gives rise to a number of questions, chief 
among them how to enforce the general consensus and keep intact the autonomy of the 
individual (his moral freedom). For Cohen the solution of this problem lies in a realistic 
ideal of a free community of equals. It is free because it respects the political autonomy 
of each of its members; it is a community because it acts on the basis of a joint ac-
knowledgement of the common good and everybody’s commitment to observe it; and 
it is a community of equals – a democratic society – because the common good reﬂ ects 
(‘gives equal weight to’) the good of every individual member. Yet this formula is open to 
several skeptical queries. Are human beings really capable to create a community of this 
kind, or is it a utopian ﬁ ction beyond our reach? Another question concerns the realism, 
or the starry-eyed optimism, of Rousseau’s assessments of people’s ability to co-operate 
in identifying, shaping and acknowledging the common good, not least a common good 
that entails unconditional equal treatment. After all, it is hard to imagine human beings 
without moral ﬂ aws like selﬁ shness, envy or pride, or an institution that could wash them 
clean of all their vices and weaknesses. A most characteristic but also rather problematic 
feature of Cohen’s approach is his claim that Rousseau’s radical political ideal was not 
incompatible with liberalism. His key values like self love, freedom and the justiﬁ cation 
of the latter based on an accord between free and equal individuals pursuing their own 
basic interests. Cohen also ﬁ nds in Rousseau’s theory a distinct streak of communitarian-
ism. It shows up in the importance attached to bonds of social and national solidarity that 
unite the citizens and to the shared values and civic obligations, which include a manda-
tory civil religion.82 The tendency to see in Rousseau’s work a combination liberal politi-
cal philosophy and communitarian sociology and social psychology also gave rise to an 
increased awareness of the tension and contradictions within that construction. What, 
however, that critical backlash seems to have lost sight of is Rousseau’s main goal, i.e. 
the reconciliation of individual autonomy and the natural interdependence of individu-
als (with all the advantages of living in a community). It should also be made clear that 
Rousseau rejects the liberal understanding of rationality as an egoistic maximization of 
personal interest; for him rationality manifests itself in the pursuit of the common good 
80  Ibidem, p. 573.
81  J. Cohen, Rousseau: Free Community of Equals, Oxford 2010, p. 12.
82  Ibidem, p. 22. 
 Iwona Barwicka-Tylek, Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves 
1-łamanie z specjalny.indd   58 2017-12-15   15:03:10
59
Artykuły – Articles
because a political system built on that principle is the sole guarantor of freedom. That 
implies that freedom is a condition (a “quality of being a man”) sustained by the hands-
on ability to recognize the common good in a rational way and then to submit to it. In 
what sense then, we could ask, is his philosophy liberal if, apart from his initial preoc-
cupation with the individual and his freedom, none of his solutions are actually liberal? 
It seems that the bast way of resolving this diﬃ  culty and getting a better understanding 
of Rousseau’s political theory and anthropology would be to put aside labels like liberal, 
republical and communitarian, nor to push him too hard into the arms of any of these 
three traditons, though that could provoke some interesting debates. 
For instance, the trend towards raising Rousseau’s communitarian proﬁ le led to his 
expulsion from the mainstream Italian–Atlantic tradition of republicanism and putting 
him at the head of to its Franco-German branch. According to Philip Pettit, Rousseau 
and Kant were the ﬁ rst to abandon the key classic republican principles of mixed gov-
ernment and “contesting citizenry”.83 Nonetheless, he still credits Rousseau with a typi-
cally republican understanding of freedom as the absence of domination, in other words 
a personal or individual dependence on someone else’s will (the “bondage”, or “enslave-
ment”, that has been discussed ealier). It requires that each citizen be independent from 
all other fellow citizens – Pettit sums up, but leaves out the rest of the stipulation, i.e. 
while participating passively or actively in the ﬁ nding of the general will. In Pettit’s 
view Rousseau’s ideas of citizenship and the state are inimical to classical republicanism 
and its Italian–Atlantic continuations. Rousseau’s aﬃ  rmation of a single, indivisible and 
inalienable sovereignty as well as his rejection of the separation of powers are cited as 
proof of his indebtedness to Bodin and Hobbes. However, Pettit’s strongest objection is 
levelled at the proposition that each person’s independence can be guaranteed by their 
collective submission to the sovereign (the general will). This, he says, is a restatement 
of the absurd claim from The Social Contract that “each man, in giving himself to all, 
gives himself to nobody”.84 In decrying this iconic quotation Pettit seems to ignore the 
fact that Rousseau does not focus on freedom and freedom’s guarantees to open his 
argument, as is the case in the liberal approach; he is concerned ﬁ rst and foremost with 
laying the foundations of a social order that could justiﬁ ably claim submission to itself.85 
The structure of the social contract based on the subjection of the individual will and its 
transformation into the legislative will, which initiates actions free from the arbitrari-
ness of decision-making driven by self-interest, is meant to provide that justiﬁ cation. 
Furthermore, Pettit’s contention that Rousseau’s notion of freedom conforms to what he 
has deﬁ ned as republican freedom falls short of the mark as well as he seems not to take 
into account the impact of virtue fostered by education on the readiness to take up civic 
duties. The Rousseauian freedom no doubt beneﬁ ts from the strengthening of the sense 
of citizenship. It seems therefore that Pettit’s interpretation does not oﬀ er us new insights 
into the central problems of Rousseau’s political theory. It does not explain the reasons 
why he decided, at least in part, to abandon the positions of the ancients, in particular 
83  Ph. Pettit, ‘Two Republican Traditions’, in: Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics, ed. A. 
Niederberger, Ph. Schink: Edinburgh 2012.
84  Ibidem, s. 178.
85  M. Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, London 2006, p. 111.
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Aristotle’s nor his unwillingness to embrace the modern approach to human nature and 
the state. 
As interpretations and critical debates continue unabated it is hardly possible to wind 
up this discussion about Rousseau’s concept of freedom with a clear conclusion. So, by 
way of a nonconclusive conclusion let us take a leaf out of a book by Jacques Derrida, 
a critic and commentator with a philosophical bent. He observes that Rousseau helped 
to wake up philosophy’s nostalgia for a return to the spoken word as the most direct 
form of communication, especially when it comes to feelings, excitement and ﬂ ashes 
of illumination. So, with regard to speech the words on the page, i.e. all of Rousseau’s 
texts, should be treated as an imperfect supplement.86 It is brought back to life only when 
we decide to break down boundaries, and ‘going down into words like going down the 
pit’ we, by our own eﬀ ort, extract from them meanings that are new although they have 
always been there.
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